Maerd wrote:
Can you supply some scientific evidences to support your statement above (that evolution of brain structure followed the sequence from MYEL, MET … to TEL)?
Support for my perspective of brain evolution came from a critical analysis of evidence provided by multiple scientific disciplines. Those disciplines included anthropology, paleontology, neurophysiology, and comparative species analysis. My method of critical analysis required that I first establish the nature of evolution then assess whether that nature applies to brain structure and, if so, how it applies. We know Charles Darwin first postulated the theory of species evolution in 1872 through his work, The Origin of Species. The Digital Evolution Laboratory at Michigan State University has since provided more recent support for Darwin’s theory through the breeding of digital organisms that mimic DNA. A singular tenet of Darwin’s postulate suggests that simple organisms can become complex animals as they adapt to the demands of survival. Paleontological study of the fossil record has continuously provided evidence suggesting that modern humans evolved from less sophisticated (primitive) forms of life, which science has generally accepted. The fossil record of human evolution suggests that modern humans (homo sapiens) evolved from the apelike creature, Australopithecus ramidus. From Australopithecus, human ancestry can be traced to the shrewlike creatures of the subclass, Prototheria. Portotheria are considered the first mammalian-type animals and are also considered the direct descendents of the Cynodontia suborder of reptiles. The ancestor of Cynodontia and the first reptilian ancestors of mammalian animals alive today were a couple of synapsid lizard-sized reptiles named Hylonomus and Archaeothyris. Synapsid reptiles are linked to mammalian ancestry through a set of low openings behind each eye socket. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Prehistoric World by Douglas Palmer contains striking illustrations and much of the information I have shared to this point. As we follow the peleontological path of human evolution backwards in time, we arrive at the first cordate, Haikouella lanceolata about 540 million years ago. Haikouella is remarkable for providing the earliest fossil evidence of brain structure, which was barely more than a notochord punctuated by an anterior bump of neural ganglia. For a picture and further information about Haikouella, select the following link: http://www.palaeos.com/Vertebrates/Units/010Chordata/010.200.html#Haikouella
When we trace the likely path of human evolution through time, we find animals whose brains, through comparative species analysis, were likely less sophisticated than modern humans. Beyond Haikouella, species analysis suggests that the earliest form of neural structure was no more than a cluster of nerves. A critical analysis of the neuroanatomy of living animals comparable to human ancestry suggests that the human brain evolved from a simple structure to its current complexity as its ancestry evolved. Our next step is to determine whether any evidence of this evolution remains in brain structure and what may have been the compelling factors in that evolution. From functional study and comparative species analysis, we know modern brain structure contains recent and primitive components. Generally, cortical structure is considered recent and brainstem structure primitive. Elements of the brainstem are considered primitive because we have found these elements, minus cortical structure, in life forms of less complexity than humanity. We have found, for example, the most primitive element of brainstem structure in existing primitive life forms comparable to those that may have existed prior to Haikouella. The MYEL (spinal brain) and spinal cord are at the base of the brainstem and should be considered the most primitive components of brainstem structure because their structure and function is comparable to the simplistic nature of the notochord development and function we find in existing primitive life forms such as annelid worms. During the embryonic phase of vertebral growth, humans included, both brain and spinal cord development arise from a notochord stage reflective of precursory neural evolution. In the MYEL, as in notochord structure, we find afferent and efferent nerves associated with heart, lung, taste, and digestion. Relative to evolution, afferent neural adaptations suggest the stage in evolution when the neural system of primitive animals began to receive and process specialized sensory information. The afferent nerves of the MYEL are the Vagus and Glossopharyngeal. These nerves provide sensory from the heart, lungs, trachea, bronchi, larynx, pharynx, GI tract, posterior tongue (1/3), tonsil, external and middle ear (tactile only). When we compare MYEL sensory adaptations with those arising from MET afferents, we can perceive clearly this sequence of subsequent brain developments as enhancements to brain structure rather than replacements of prior structures—in accord with the evolutional process. The afferent nerves of the MET are the Vestibulocochlear, the Intermediate Facial, and the Trigeminal. The Vestibulocochlear nerve enhanced the tactile ear sensory of MYEL structure with the perception of sound sensory. The Intermediate Facial nerve enhanced the posterior taste distinctions of MYEL function with anterior tongue sensory (2/3) and soft palate distinctions. Finally, the Trigeminal provide sensory enhancements from the face, sinus, and teeth. These afferent nerves arise in MET structure separately and in the order given here. When we evaluate where and when these nerves appear in MET structure and the sensory capability they provide, we can track the evolutional direction of taste, sound, and facial perception from simplistic posterior developments to refined anterior developments. When we apply this kind of analysis to the rest of brain structure, I believe we find sufficient evidence of its evolutional path from MYEL to TEL--a path that suggests how more recent sensory developments enhanced the distinctions of prior developments. The Atlas of Human Anatomy, Third Edition by Dr. Frank H. Netter provides wonderful illustrations of brainstem neural development.
Maerd wrote:
To my understanding, Dr. Hobson's activation-synthesis model was developed based on Dr. Jouvet's findings. But, Dr. Solms's article was a critique of activation-synthesis model. I suggest you to re-read Dr. Solms's paper titled "Dreaming and REM sleep are Contronlled by Different Brain Mechanisms", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2000; 23 (6):843-50.
I stand corrected. Solms, Siegel, Jouvet, and Hobson; I tend to lump them all together in my perspective. As I now recall of Solms’s assessment, his distinction of disassociation between REM and dreaming reside in lesioning and pharmacological studies focusing on prefrontal function. In his review, as I recall, whether or not dreaming occurred was dependent on a study participant’s ability to awake with memory of having dreamed. I believe we both agree on the importance of prefrontal function in the conversion of short-term to long-term memory. When we damage or interfere with prefrontal function, our ability to recall short-term experiences seems to disappear. In Solms’s view, REM and brain activity in sleep without any memory of dreaming upon waking is evidence that dreaming did not occur. To him, this is evidence of disassociation. Solms’s error, in my opinion, is his failure to consider the affect of prefrontal lesions and function inhibitors on a participant’s ability to remember dreaming. After all, reports of dreaming are memory dependent and any interference with those brain processes associated with memory could conceivably obliterate the memory experience of having dreamed as though it never occurred. In my view, the most reliable evidence of whether a person has dreamed is provided by functional analysis. To my knowledge, there is no reliable evidence that REM, in an intact brain, can occur without the brain activity we find in dream sleep. I encourage your further thoughts.
Maerd wrote:
I agree with you in general that brainstem is mainly primitive and cortical structure is mainly recent. However, not all cortical structures, in my view, are recent; and not all brainstem structures are primitive. For example, the reticular formation of the brainstem and the cortex probably started their evolution process at same period of time, as either destroying the reticular formation or severing cortex from the rest of brain will lead to a coma state.
This link, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7845593&dopt=Citation, provides an abstract of research that shows the resumption of paradoxical brain activity after the destruction of the medullary reticular formation. This suggests the independence of cortical activation from reticular function and belies the idea of their concurrent evolution. However, cortical dependency on subcortical afferents supports the contiguous and sequential nature of brain evolution. Clearly, reticular function does not depend on cortical activation. However, Jouvet’s experiments proved cortical function is non-existent in the absence of subcortical afferents. Like all other contiguous structures of our central nervous system, the functional dependency of a neural structure on another determines its place in the hierarchy of brain evolution. If agreed, then the cortex clearly evolved after the reticular formation.
Maerd wrote:
I don't think that prefrontal plays very important role in the conversion of short-term memory to long-term memory. With prefrontal leukotomy study as an example, damage along prefrontal system produces disorders characterized by reduced interest, reduced initiative, reduced imagination and reduced ability to plan ahead (where the patient does nothing unless instructed). Thus, some researchers describe prefrontal as the "seeking" or "wanting command system of the brain".
The following links provide evidence of research associating prefrontal function with memory: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v386/n6625/abs/386604a0.html http://www.csbmb.princeton.edu/ncc/PDFs/Atten-Ctl-WM%20&%20PFC-DA/Neuroimaging/Braver%20et%20al%20(NeuroImage%2097).pdf http://jocn.mitpress.org/cgi/content/abstract/16/6/908 http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/3/906
Maerd wrote:
In my view, dream recalls are not dependent of long-term memory. Although we all dream every day when we sleep, we can seldom recollect more than a few minutes worth of our dreams after waking. Our experience told us that unless being recalled immediately after waking, dreams cannot be remembered.
Prefrontal function has been associated with short-term memory (working memory). I believe dreaming only involves working memory, which is one reason why we forget them so quickly when we awake. Although most of our dreams are forgotten when we awake, we still have memory of having experienced something in our sleep. That memory residue is likely a product of working memory. As I have proposed, when we lesion the brain or interfere with those brain processes associated with forming dream memory, we can conceivable awake with no recollection of having dreamed. This, I believe, is essentially what Solms did not consider in his review.
Maerd wrote:
I don't know if you are familiar with a widely studied case of memory impairment, a patient named as "H.M." or "Henry M". After removal of large sections of the medial temporal lobes (includes the hippocampus) of the brain to relieve epilepsy in 1953, Henry could only remember recent events for a few minutes. Isn't this in some way mirror the same problem that we face for dream recall?
Although I am not familiar with Henry M’s case, I am familiar with the work of Dr. Brenda Milner who used a similar surgical procedure for treatment of intractable epilepsy. She experienced similar memory results. My perspective of prefrontal structure and working memory is that its function plays an important role in the memory formation process. Any interference with that process could affect our ability to remember our experiences and, especially, those experiences that do not appear to involve true physical reality—such as dreams.
I perceive the experience of dreaming as a process entirely comprised of working memory. I believe prefrontal function plays a significant role in the lasting memories we retain from our working memory. From my perspective of working memory and dreaming, lasting or long-term memory is the recollection of having experienced something amid sleep; i.e., I perceive those fading sensations we experience when waking from sleep as our dreaming brain’s equivalent of long-term memory. Although we may ultimately forget our dream experiences when we awake, our fading residual memories of them are the working memories I believe our brain has tried to convert to long-term. I welcome your continued thoughts.
Maerd wrote:
http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/126/7/1524 : http://download.videohelp.com/vitualis/med/reticular_formation.htm http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=284730&dopt=Abstract
I selected the links you provided to get some sense of the basis for your perspective on brain evolution. Your second link did not appear to access actual research and your third link provided merely a title; however, your first link did have content from which I have provided this excerpt:
"In the beginning of the 20th century, Bremer (1935 ) showed that in lightly anaesthetized cats, the transection of the brainstem at the pontomesencephalic level caused coma, whereas a transection at the level of the spinomedullary junction did not. In another experiment, Moruzzi and Magoun (1949 ) showed that stimulation within the brainstem reticular formation of lightly anaesthetized cats resulted in high frequency/low amplitude (so-called desynchronized) EEG, an electrophysiological correlate of the conscious state, whereas lesions of the same region of the reticular formation caused coma with low frequency/high amplitude (so-called synchronized) EEG. These results led to the suggestion that the upper brainstem reticular formation is the origin of a system involved in activating the cerebral cortex, namely the ARAS, and that the process of cortical activation is indispensable for the maintenance of consciousness (Fig. 1A). Subsequent clinical observations showed that lesions in the upper brainstem reticular formation are a major cause of coma (Loeb, 1958 ; Loeb and Stirling Meyer, 1965 ; Chase et al., 1968 ). Eventually, Plum and Posner (1980 ) used a series of clinical and pathological observations to establish the now classical notion that coma in humans is caused by lesions occurring in the reticular formation territory extending from the upper third of the pons to the upper limits of the midbrain."
If I understand correctly, this article provides research supporting a conclusion that damage to the “upper third” of the reticular formation causes coma, whereas, damage to the lower two-thirds does not. If I also understand correctly, you have provided this article as evidence of some concurrent cortical and brainstem evolution. To prove concurrency, the research should show an interdependency of function between the cortex and reticular formation. Also, the research should suggests some exclusivity of cortical and reticular function. Clearly, your first reference provides research that does not show mutual dependency between the cortex and reticular; it shows that cortical activation is dependent on reticular function and not the other way around. If brain structure follows a path prescribed by evolution, then primitive elements of brain structure should provide a foundation for recent elements. Again, your first reference supports the idea of the cortex evolving after the reticular of the brainstem because its research provides brainstem (reticular) function as a foundation for cortical activation. A further analysis of this research also belies exclusivity of function. As your reference clearly provides, two-thirds of reticular structure did not evolve exclusively to stimulate cortical activity and evidence of fatal hyperthermia suggests that the upper third did not initially evolve that purpose as well. The occurrence of fatal hyperthermia after destruction of the upper reticular suggests a connection between the reticular and hypothalamic thermoregulation. Contiguously, the hypothalamus arises in brain structure before the cortex and after the reticular.
Maerd wrote:
Since consciousness can be eliminated by either destroying the reticular formation in the brainstem (the headquarters of consciousness, in my view) or the whole cortex (its supporting systems, in my view), this indicates that it is a necessary condition for both reticular formation and, at least, one subsystem of cortex to be functional to have consciousness. Thus, I don't think the whole cortex evolved after the reticular formation (although I agree that most part of cortex evolved after).
I disagree. The behaviors of decorticate animals and congenitally decorticate children suggests the cortex may not be necessary for consciousness and likewise for reticular activity. Here are a couple of references: Oakely, D.A. “Performance of Decorticated Rats in a Two-Choice Visual Discrimination Apparatus.” Behav Brain Res. (1981): 3(1): 55-69 Shewmon, D.A. etal, “Consciousness in Congenitally Decorticate Children: Developmental Vegetative State As Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.” Dev Med Child Neurol. (1999): 41(6): 364-74 You should also consider a search of Google Scholar for further “Decorticate” research.
Maerd wrote:
Although its concept (by Baddeley, 1974) was initially developed from short-term memory, working memory refers to the structures and processes used for temporarily storing and manipulating information. In the theoretical framework of working memory, short-term memory is only a very small portion of it…The links that you referred above are studies of working memory (mainly about human information processing and manipulating). It is true that results of scientific studies have strongly suggested that prefrontal played a very important role in working memory processing and manipulating. But, not in memory saving, as Solms and other researchers described prefrontal function as the "seeking" or "wanting command system of the brain".
If you recall, I disagreed with Solms assessment because he and others did not consider how brain lesioning and function inhibitors might affect a sleeper’s capacity to remember the experience of dreaming. He and others perceive no memory of dreaming as evidence of non-dreaming occurrence. I said that any interference with the brain processes that produce memory could conceivably affect a sleeper’s ability to awake with memories of having dreamed. I perceive no distinction between short-term and working memory. However, our general perception of working memory as you have described is how I perceive the experience of dreaming. If you agree that prefrontal function plays “a very important role in working memory processing and manipulating,” and “dreaming indicates that working memory is working during sleep,” isn’t it possible that damage of the prefrontal and interference with its function could affect a sleeper’s ability to recall dreaming after waking from sleep?
Maerd wrote:
Actually, Dr. Milner was the first to study H.M. case. She co-authored the paper "Loss of Recent Memory after Bilateral Hippocampal Lesions" with Dr. Scoville (who did the surgery) in 1957 about H.M. case. Based on the patterns of Henry's memory loss, researchers formed the following hypotheses about memory formation: 1.) Short-term memories are biologically different from long-term memories because they do not require the hippocampus for formation. 2.) Long-term memories are stored throughout the brain, but the hippocampus is necessary for the information to reach long-term storage. Once the memory is permanently stored, however, the hippocampus is no longer required. Said another way: the hippocampus is important for long-term memory formation, but not for memory maintenance or retrieval.
Unfortunately, I did not recall her patient’s name having not referenced her work for some time now. It was my recollection that she performed the surgery but had to take second chair on the credits because of her female status. So much for long-term memory.
Maerd wrote:
So, it is the hippocampus that plays an important role in the memory formation process (from short-term to long-term). I don't know why you believe the prefrontal structure "plays an important role in the memory formation process".
In explanation, I provide this excerpt from our prior discussion:
"The evidence in evolution suggests that the cortex evolved as an enhancement to the memory function initiated by limbic development (hippocampus included). Although elements of the limbic system have been associated with emotions, the research evidence clearly provides its strongest association with memory functions. As an enhancement to memory, the cortex allows us to create a mental environment in which we can modify or construct behavioral responses to obtain our subcortical objectives. In studies of prefrontal damage and lobotomy, the primary lost in brain function appears to be associated with an inability to assess consequence or a lack of interest in the consequences of one's actions. In animals ancestral to humans, the only influences of consequence were those of physical impact on their survival. During D-sleep (dreaming), prefrontal function is depressed while other brain areas increase in activity. This function remains depressed because physical sensory does not enter the cortex during D-sleep as it does when we are consciously awake. Physical sensory is encoded by our physical senses. Dream imagery is produced by resonant influences from the brainstem that are not encoded by our physical senses. Therefore, the prefrontal remains inactive during dream sleep. Because our prefrontal makes us care about [the consequences of] our physical experiences, the experiences we encounter while awake are easier to remember. Because dreams do not contain the physical markers of conscious physical experience, our prefrontal does not attach significance to dreams and we forget them easily as a consequence. When we remember our dreams, that memory is a product of our awaking sensory systems that begin to integrate their physical/material information with the information swirling in our heads, from our dream experiences, as we wake. This integration from our physical sensory arouses our prefrontal function, which attaches the significance to our dream experiences that makes them memorable."
Maerd wrote:
I would say that, yes, dreaming indicates that working memory is working during sleep. However, the fact that we don't remember our dreams suggests that dreams have not been converted into long-term memory during sleep. As a result, we can only recall dreams saved in the short-term memory if we recall them immediately after arousal.
If we are recalling dreams immediately after arousal, I believe what we are recalling is working memory. In my view, our effort to retrieve dream memories when we awake is an effort to convert working memories into long-term memories. Dreaming, in my view, is a mental experience comprised entirely of working memory. Working memory, in my perspective, is like an echo; it reverberates strongly in the beginning but fades unless renewed. As I perceive, dreaming is an experience of the mental reverberations from our conscious life that persist into sleep. I welcome your further thoughts.
Maerd wrote:
My purpose of referring these references was to point out that reticular formation function is necessary for consciousness.
If you recall these comments, which began this direction in our discussion:
Maerd wrote:
However, not all cortical structures, in my view, are recent; and not all brainstem structures are primitive. For example, the reticular formation of the brainstem and the cortex probably started their evolution process at same period of time, as either destroying the reticular formation or severing cortex from the rest of brain will lead to a coma state.
As I have said, the references you provided does not appear to support your conclusion of mutual brainstem and cortex evolution. Clearly, reticular function is a foundation for cortical activation and the reticular’s contribution to thermoregulation suggests that cortical activation is not its only evolutionary function. This all appears to support the idea that the reticular evolved before and independent of cortical structure.
Maerd wrote:
Your first reference stated: "Normal rats and rats with 98.8% (S.D. ± 1.4) of neocortex surgically removed…” I only found an abstract of the article, I don't know if they have any example of total decortication in this study. Your second reference gave four cases of congenitally decorticate children…However, none of the cases…can be claimed as total decortication (absolutely devoid of cortical tissue).
Agreed. It may be that 1.2% of cortical structure in rodents and minor remnants of cortical tissue in children are all that is necessary to manifest the behaviors researchers have observed. However, there are better examples of normal or near normal behaviors in animals devoid of cortical structure, such as: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=630411&dopt=Citation From the extract:
“The thalamic preparation [all structures excised above the thalamus in rats] exhibited a wider range of intact neurological responses than the decerebrate. Cage climbing, resistance to gravity, suspension and muscle tone reactions, rhythmic vibrissae movements and examination of objects with snout and mandible were difficult to distinguish from controls.”
http://www.springerlink.com/content/j371x40818hm7t01/ From the summary:
“Bilateral removal of the cerebral cortex was made in cats neonatally. Spontaneous and imposed behaviour was studied while they were growing up and after they had become adult. Special emphasis was put on the utilization of visual cues and on learning. The cats ate, drank and groomed themselves adequately. Adequate maternal and female sexual behaviour was observed.”
Although the results obtained through animal research cannot be obtained ethically through human research, their implication in lower life forms at the very least suggest that much of the behaviors we associate with consciousness either exist or remain in brain structure in the absence or near absence of the cortex. Such results suggest how some aspects of consciousness may not have evolved with cortical structure.
Maerd wrote:
Also, consider this question: if cerebral cortical function is not necessary for conscious, why should consciousness not occur in all decorticated situation?
Perhaps the following excerpt from Shewmon’s article provides an answer: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1469-8749.1999.tb00621.x?cookieSet=1
Shewmon wrote:
"If these children had been kept in institutions (as subject 2 was for the first 1.5 years) or treated at home as ‘vegetables’ (the prognosis being accepted uncritically by parents), there can be little doubt that they would have turned out exactly as predicted. What surely made all the difference was that their parents ignored the prognoses and advice, and instead followed their instinct to shower the children with loving stimulation and affection. Such children and their families have much to teach about not only the neurophysiology of consciousness."
Maerd quotes:
DrmDoc wrote: If you agree that prefrontal function plays “a very important role in working memory processing and manipulating,” and “dreaming indicates that working memory is working during sleep,” isn’t it possible that damage of the prefrontal and interference with its function could affect a sleeper’s ability to recall dreaming after waking from sleep?
Maerd response: Interference with working memory function does not necessarily affect short-term memory. Working memory and short-term memory are two distinct concepts.
From your perspective, I agree that the concepts of working memory and short-term memory seem different; however, that was not my question. My question, more succinctly, was whether interference with working memory in the prefrontal could affect the working memory associated with dreaming? If so, couldn’t this affect a sleeper’s recall of dreaming?
Maerd wrote:
In my view, dream recall is to use our working memory to retrieve whatever we have in our short-term memory store…The reason that we have to retrieve them immediately after arousal is because short-term memory has a very limited capacity, decays rapidly and will be replaced by new incoming information once we turn our attention to a new task…While awake, anything that processed by working memory will be saved into long-term memory, including dream recall…In my view, working memory is like the computer processors plus supporting RAM. Dreaming is a result of our brain (working memory) interpreting and processing (mainly) internally generated inputs. Long-term memory is the main source for these internally generated inputs.
As I now understand, your perspective of memory is based on a standard model consisting of working memory, short-term, and long-term. My perspective is non-standard consisting of just working and long-term memory. From your perspective, dreaming involves the retrieval of long-term memories into working memory and dream recall is an effort to retrieve the short-term memories resulting from the working memories associated with dreaming. In my view, dreaming is caused by the resonant mental effects of life experience that linger into sleep. Dream recall, in my view, is an effort to identify those resonant mental effects that persist after sleep. As I perceive, the mental effects that linger into sleep and persist after sleep are effects of working memories. In my view, dreaming is a mental effect of working memory and working memory a mental process effected by life experience. When we awake and try to remember our dreams, our effort to remember is an effort to reinforce the mental effects we experience in sleep with physical/material references. This effort, I believe, causes the memories of dreaming we keep long-term. In my view, long-term describes any memory experience that we do not immediately forget. I welcome your further thoughts.
To be continued...
Tuesday, April 1, 2008
Monday, March 31, 2008
Brain Evolution and Dreaming
Hello All,
Some time ago, I had a lenghty and fascinating discussion about brain evolution and dreaming. The website where this discussion occurred is no longer online. Therefore, for those who have a continued interest in that discussion, I have provided access here to my archive of that discussion. Unfortunately, my archive primarily contain comments from my side the discussion. Here is the first of those discussions. The comments in plain colored text are mine:
Hi Maerd,
Maerd wrote:
Nice to meet you here.
Very nice indeed! I believe this is a place where, hopefully, we can engage in cordial and insightful exchanges free of arbitrary and draconian limits.
Maerd wrote:
From the evolution point of view, conscious beings were evolved from non-conscious beings. What is your view about why consciousness evolved? A similar question is: what was the core difference between the highest non-conscious state (right before evolution of consciousness) and the lowest conscious state (right after evolution of consciousness) for a given being?
This is a great beginning and I was hoping your interest would involve an idea I expressed elsewhere. If you recall, that idea involved neuroscience and whether it can determine the nature of consciousness. In my opinion, as I have expressed, neuroscience can only explain the physical nature of consciousness but not the nature of consciousness itself. The evidence I have explored has convinced me that the nature of consciousness truly transcends the physical. I believe there are levels of consciousness beyond the contemporary brain’s capacity to manifest. The evidence for this comes in the form of after-death-contact (ADC) dream experiences wherein the dreamer could not possibly know that the person in his/her dream was deceased. At its most basic level consciousness, I believe, is merely physical awareness; i.e., an awareness suggested by the nature of tactile sensory. At the level ADC suggests, consciousness involves some ethereal form of awareness. Relative to evolution, some level of consciousness has existed from the very beginning of life—in my opinion. In my view, consciousness inhabits the physical and the structure of the physical determines the level of consciousness expressed or achieved through the physical. Comparing the nature of consciousness to an automobile driver, the physical would be represented by the automobile. I perceive the various components of the automobile as representing the various components of our central nervous system (CNS). Relative to evolution, the earliest incarnation of consciousness was like a driver who only had access to the chassis of an automobile--at the beginning of early life, consciousness had the makings of a vehicle but did not have the necessary components to properly manifest or transport through the physical. This is represented by the most primitive component of our CNS, the myelencephalon. As our CNS evolved, consciousness gained the capacity to reach new levels of expression and achievement through the physical. These are my thoughts, I welcome yours.
Hi Maerd,
Quote:
From the evolution point of view, shouldn't consciousness follow a pattern of gradual change with time from an initial very simple level of conscious state (when consciousness first evolved) into a more complicated, higher level of conscious state (like what we are today)?
From my perspective, consciousness is like a quantity of water and the physical is like a cup. Evolution, in my view, only applies to the cup not the water. I perceive consciousness as a constant that only changes as the cup of physicality evolves to contain greater quantities. In the beginning, the simplistic nature of physicality limited the quantity and quality of consciousness to simplistic levels. The earliest forms of planetary life (photoautotrophs) manifested a photosynthetic existence—a simplistic existence dependent on photosynthesis. As the demands of physicality grew, the cup of physicality evolved. This evolution of the physical enabled greater quantities of consciousness manifesting a more complicated existence—a complex existence dependent on foraging and predation. The way I speak of consciousness in the prior paragraph is how I perceive what some might consider our spiritual essence. From a strictly neurological perspective, consciousness is a manifestation of recent brain elements supported by primitive components of brain structure. As suggested by evolution, consciousness evolved in brain structure about 540 million years ago (about 3 billion years after the first forms of planetary life). My view of consciousness in brain structure is defined by the functions of the brain’s various components. For example, I believe that the primitive brain began to function as a mind when brain structure reached the thalamic level of evolution. I believe that the cortex is merely a sophisticated extension of the memory function began by limbic development. Also, I believe that the distinction between the conscious and unconscious mind and the nature of the subconscious is suggested by the distinction between the awake, sleep, and dream states of brain function. Your further thoughts are most welcome.
Hi Marcel,
Welcome to our discussion:
Marcel wrote:
I have other examples about the distinction: Take someone extremely sharp-whitted who get Alzheimer's disease. This person's apparent consiousness will decrease over time. Consider someone real bright who has brain damage after a car accident who has difficulty following a normal conversation. I'm sure you can come up with many such examples indicating the 'cup' has a dramatic impact on a person's ability to interact with the physical world. I do wonder how the cup and the water are tied? When the cup carries a given volume of water and gets damaged, does the water get drained to a certain degree?
Insightful! Indeed, disease and brain damage can siphon consciousness to levels below optimum. In my view, the destruction of brain tissue obstructs the access of consciousness to those aspects of the cup that facilitate such functions as memory, thought, and locomotion. Conversely, the cup of healthy brain structure may not be filled to its limit; i.e., consciousness may not have reached its full potential through current brain structure. When I think about the limits of consciousness imposed by the cup of physicality, I think about what may have been the distinction in brain function that led to the extinction of the Neanderthals and the rise of modern humans. If there was a distinction between the Neanderthals and modern humans, I believed brain structure and function would likely suggest what that distinction might have been. From my assessment of the evidence suggested by evolution and modern brain structure, our distinction from Neanderthals may reside in our use of the cortex and its functions that facilitate anticipatory behaviors. When we compare what we know of Neanderthal culture to modern human culture, we find very little innovations in how they lived and in the tools they used. This suggests to me, in basic terms, that Neanderthals were limited in their ability to anticipate their future needs. Collectively, I believe Neanderthals had reached the limits of their cortical facility—their consciousness could not exceed the limits their brain function imposed. As a cup for consciousness, the Neanderthal brain probably could not accommodate the measure and quality of thought processing essential to the kind of innovations modern humans have produced. If history is any example, another may yet supplant the cup of modern human consciousness. I encourage and welcome your further thoughts.
Hi Maerd,
Maerd wrote:
It is interesting to make analogies between the brain structure (for consciousness) and a "cup", and between the consciousness and "water". However, since "water" existed long before "cups", does your analogy imply that consciousness existed long before the evolution of brain structure and thus was independent of the brain structure?
Excellent question! Frankly, I have yet to consider completely the nature of consciousness before and beyond the physical suggested by this analogy’s implication. My perspective, thus far, only extends to how I perceive the nature of consciousness within the cup. Conceivably, consciousness may exist in some form that transcends the cup; i.e., consciousness may not be restricted to what it is able to manifest, express, or achieve through corporeal experience. If so, consciousness could have existed in some non-corporeal form long before the evolution of physical structure—inclusive of the brain. However, we generally equate consciousness with sentience and sentience with brain development. Accordingly, my perspective suggests how consciousness arose with the evolution of brain structure. I welcome your further thoughts.
Marcel wrote:
Using more of our brain would require more energy…Could we conceivably consider awakening all our past and present experiences and bringing them out to a conscious level simultaneously? This cup would be quite full…A little bit like a book, you cannot access all of it’s contents at once. You may look at all of a page at once, but grasping all the text’s meaning at once would require much concentration and multitasking.
Your thoughts here bring to my mind the interesting case of Kim Peek; he inspired Dustin Hoffman’s character in the movie Rain Man. Kim is an autistic savant with extraordinary memory capabilities. He can recall from memory any number of obscure facts as though laid before him in an opened book. One oddity of his recall involved the way his factual memory appeared to be organized; e.g., if the answer to a memory question involved a date fact, he might lurch into a song that was either written in a score he associated with the fact or was entitled in a way suggestive of it—as though all were somehow correct.
Marcel wrote:
…Maybe we are talking of 2 different kinds of cups…I wonder if the distinction is one of consciousness or one of brain canvas. I like comparing the eyesight focus with the concentration focus. Focussing on one thing reduces the ability to function around another, but this may be circumstantial. To this we may add the dimension of impairment that shifts a person’s comfort zone (eyesight or concentration) outside the “norm”.
In a TV program exploring Kim’s remarkable talent (The Real Rain Man, Discover Channel, air date uncertain), a doctor who had examined Kim’s medical record said that his brain did not have a corpus callosum (a condition known as agenesis). This suggested to me that the ability of Kim’s consciousness was a matter of canvas rather than focus, using your analogies. Kim’s canvas, his brain, does not have the configuration of normal or average brain structure. Therefore, his consciousness could only access memories and behavioral distinctions in the manner his canvas or cup permitted. Consequently, the grouping of facts in Kim’s mind and his autistic behavior seem peculiar to us of normal or average brain structure. This suggests to me that most distinctions we perceive between each other are likely a matter of brain structure rather than consciousness itself; we, on some basic level, are a force of equal potential primarily separated and limited by our brain configuration. From another perspective, we know from brain study how experience changes brain structure. New experiences form memories that can create new neural connections. In human studies, child neglect has resulted in below average brain development. In animal studies, the brain size of some domesticated animals was found to be smaller than their wild counterparts presumably because the experience of wild animals is richer. This all appears to suggest how genius or the expression of consciousness could be a matter of brain canvas/cup/configuration—in my opinion. I welcome your thoughts.
A compelling perspective:
Maerd wrote:
As we know, all life forms are composed of molecules that are not themselves alive. Same is true here. All conscious forms are composed of molecules that are not themselves conscious. From my perspective, consciousness vs. physical structure is like living (life) vs. "a pack of neurons".
Whether or not molecules are conscious is a matter of perspective, is it not? I think it is human nature to define “what is” and “what is not” by human standards; we judge others and other things by how we perceive ourselves. Can we be so sure about the non-existence of molecular consciousness just because it may not conform to our definition of consciousness? Perhaps we should consider what defines consciousness. As Marcel conveyed, the expanded use of brain function requires expanded energy. We know the brain cannot grow or function without energy. Every perception, thought, and feeling we experience requires and expends energy. By human standards, consciousness requires and expends energy. Therefore, on some basic level, consciousness may potentially exist wherever energy is required and expended. This seems to apply to atomic and subatomic particles. As I also perceive, another requirement or identifier of consciousness is its ability to define itself—an ability to distinguish itself as apart from its surroundings. A rock, for example, is not consciousness from our perspective. However, the molecules within the rock define how we perceive it. The molecular activity within the rock requires and expends energy to define its shape as a rock—does this not meet some basic criteria of consciousness? I welcome your thoughts.
Maerd wrote:
Do you define consciousness as energy????
No, of course not. I was merely suggesting how our perspective of consciousness, at this unenlightened stage in our evolution, could be a bit narrow.
Maerd wrote:
…why did you study the evolution of consciousness since energy (=consciousness) has nothing to do with evolution?
Actually, my interest in consciousness is merely an existential pursuit that satisfies the part of my being preconditioned from my youth to spiritualism. However, the interest enthralling the part of me that demands empirical evidence is not the study of consciousness but rather the study of the brain and brain function. Consciousness, as we generally define this quality, is a product of brain function; therefore, consciousness cannot exist corporeally without an underlying neurological structure as its progenitor. Empirically, our mind and psychology arise from the structure and function of our brain. My interest in brain evolution evolved from my investigation of how sleep and dreaming animals evolved. The clearest path for my study was provided by brain structure and how its components contributed to the sleep process. When I began to track the nature of sleep from the primitive components of the brain to recent components, it became clear to me that our ideas about contemporary brain structure and function lacked a proper foundation. Consequently, our ideas about functional distinctions and a host of brain related conditions and process could be incorrect. For example, contemporary science views the thalamus as sort of a switching station for sensory information entering and exiting the brain. The evolution of the thalamus suggests that it was the first incarnation of a proper brain (right and left hemisphere and hemispheric adhesion) marking the stage in evolution when the brain began to produce a mind. Perhaps more interesting is how the acquisition of sight perception may have led to thalamic and subsequent cortical evolution. The implications of a proper foundation in brain evolution could change how we diagnosis and treat brain trauma and conditions such as autism, Alzheimer, and insomnia just to name a few—in my opinion. I welcome your continued interest.
Maerd wrote:
My perspective is that one can not fully understand brain function without study of consciousness, as I believe that consciousness played a leading role in the formation and evolution of brain structure.
Again, I think the part consciousness played in brain evolution depends on how we define the nature of consciousness.
Maerd wrote:
I think consciousness and mind is basically the same thing.
I would agree if not for the perspective my investigation of brain evolution has provided. As we know, the brain is comprised of primitive and recent components. When we examine the most primitive components, we do not find the neurological developments suggestive of consciousness as we generally perceive. My investigation suggests that the energy needs of preexistent life compelled the adaptations leading to brain evolution. As that evolution appears to suggest, mind and consciousness are not quite the same. From my perspective of brain evolution, a mind is an environment of cognitive activity that arises from brain function within brain structure. Neurologically, brain function produces the mind and the mind produces consciousness. The clearest perspective of the distinction between mind and consciousness is suggested by my perspective of dream experience and content. In my perspective, the dreamer (as a dream component) describes or manifests his/her consciousness while the dreamer’s surroundings in a dream manifest his/her environment of cognitive activity; i.e., the dreamer = consciousness while the dream environment = mind. In my view, the mind is infinitely easier to understand and study than any other product of brain function. When we examine the evolutional path brain structure traveled to its current state, I think we find clear evidence of when and where the brain began producing a mind.
Maerd wrote:
What is the relationship between consciousness and sleep? Aren't they interrelated?
I believe dreaming provides the only link to consciousness amid sleep. As we have discussed elsewhere, dreaming isn’t sleep from my perspective. As you know, the dreaming brain engages in levels of activity equivalent to a wakeful brain. This suggests that dreaming could be a form consciousness amid sleep. Why we dream, as we have discussed, may not be as important to brain function and the nature of consciousness as the atonic release that accompanies dreaming. Dreaming without atonia does not produce the kind of restful sleep and increased mental acuity after sleep as dreaming does when concurrent with atonia. Dreaming is important to consciousness only to the extent to which we able to understand the relevance of dream content to our mental wellbeing. I welcome your thoughts.
Maerd wrote:
In my view, mind doesn't produce consciousness. Consciousness and mind come along hand in hand. Actually, one has to have consciousness to have mind…I would say that one can not fully understand mind without understanding of consciousness.
I assume your perspective is based on an assessment of brain function. Any idea we form about the nature of mind and consciousness without a valid basis in brain structure and function is probably unreliable—in my opinion. Perhaps if I provide the basis for my perspective of mind and consciousness, you will understand my conviction. I believe we agree that mind and consciousness are products of brain function. I also believe we agree that brain function comprises a concert of neural activity involving recent and primitive brain structures. When we evaluate these structures from the perspective of evolution, we get a sense of what the mind may be, how it evolved, and what constitutes its nature. So, let’s begin with evolution. What is evolution? Some of us perceive evolution as nature’s way of replacing older, less adaptive species with robust, more adaptive types. In reality, nature does not replace less adaptive species; it builds upon the successes of less adaptive species to create more adaptive types. Relative to brain structure, its primitive components are the foundation upon which nature has constructed our modern brain. From primitive to recent, brain structure is comprised of six segments: myelencephalon (MYEL), metencephalon (MET), mesencephalon (MES), diencephalon (DIEN), and telencephalon (TEL). Each segment provides a foundation for each seceding segment; e.g., MYEL is a foundation for MET function, MET a foundation for MES, etc. The neural evidence each segment provides suggests how each may have contributed to the adaptability of preexistent species. For example, animals at the MET stage of neural development had the advantage of sound perception, heighten taste distinctions, and gross locomotion over animals who had not evolved beyond the MYEL stage; animals at the initial stage of DIEN neural development had the advantage of sight perception over lesser evolved MET animals. When we evaluate brain structure contiguously from primitive to recent elements, we find structures associated with sight perception arising after those involving sound and before thalamic development. This was a critical development in brain evolution because the separate neurological sources of sensory information suggested by sight and sound perception meant that early animals had to integrate this divergent sensory before initiating some behavioral response to what they might have seen or heard. When early animals began to integrate what they heard or felt with what they perceived visually, they gained the ability to make behavior distinctions proactively. Rather than react to sound or tactile sensory, sighted animals could visually assess whether what they heard and felt required a response. Simply put, the integration of sight with earlier sensory abilities gave primitive animals the ability to think before reacting. The brain structure that corresponds to this development in early animals is the thalamus. From what we know of contemporary thalamic structure, all sensory information (except olfactory) must enter the thalamus before reaching superior brain structures. In early animals, the thalamus was the final destination for all sensory information; it gave primitive animals the ability to integrate multiple types of sensory input in a way that probably allowed them to produce behaviors independent of instinct. The capacity to engage in behaviors independent of instinct identifies a primary attribute of mind. The thalamus, with its right and left hemisphere and interthalamic adhesion, was likely nature’s prototype for contemporary cortical development. This evidence suggests to me that thalamic function defines what constitutes a mind.
Maerd wrote:
Dr. Mark Solms pointed out "dreaming and REM sleep are in fact doubly dissociable states, they have different physiological mechanisms, and in all likelihood they serve different functional purposes."
I disagree with Dr. Solms’ assessment because a critical analysis of his methods suggests he may have misinterpreted the result of his research. For example, REM (rapid eye movement) is believed to be disassociated with dreaming primarily because of experiments by Dr. Michel Jouvet in the early 1960’s. In animal experiments separating MES and MET structures from superior structures (low-decerebration), Jouvet found REM concurrent with atonia. This suggested to Jouvet that the neural mechanism for dreaming resides in this lower segment of brainstem. To Dr. Solms, the reactivation of superior brain structure (cortical structure) after separation from MES/MET structure suggested that the mechanisms for REM and dreaming are disassociated. Jouvet’s assessment of his results was incorrect because the REM he observed was the result of residual nerve impulses that surfaced after the cessation of surrounding MES/MET tonic neural activity. Solms’ assessment, based on the distinction Jouvet provided, is incorrect because Jouvet’s experiment ostensibly proved REM to be a product of the hierarchal brain activity that occurs while dreaming. Our eyes move when we experience dreaming because of their neural connection to our higher brain function. When we dream, our eyes move and our body does not because they do not share the same neural circuitry. Should Dr. Solms review the neural anatomy associated with eye movement, I believe he will find the idea of PGO spikes inspired movement unlikely. I welcome your thoughts
Some time ago, I had a lenghty and fascinating discussion about brain evolution and dreaming. The website where this discussion occurred is no longer online. Therefore, for those who have a continued interest in that discussion, I have provided access here to my archive of that discussion. Unfortunately, my archive primarily contain comments from my side the discussion. Here is the first of those discussions. The comments in plain colored text are mine:
Hi Maerd,
Maerd wrote:
Nice to meet you here.
Very nice indeed! I believe this is a place where, hopefully, we can engage in cordial and insightful exchanges free of arbitrary and draconian limits.
Maerd wrote:
From the evolution point of view, conscious beings were evolved from non-conscious beings. What is your view about why consciousness evolved? A similar question is: what was the core difference between the highest non-conscious state (right before evolution of consciousness) and the lowest conscious state (right after evolution of consciousness) for a given being?
This is a great beginning and I was hoping your interest would involve an idea I expressed elsewhere. If you recall, that idea involved neuroscience and whether it can determine the nature of consciousness. In my opinion, as I have expressed, neuroscience can only explain the physical nature of consciousness but not the nature of consciousness itself. The evidence I have explored has convinced me that the nature of consciousness truly transcends the physical. I believe there are levels of consciousness beyond the contemporary brain’s capacity to manifest. The evidence for this comes in the form of after-death-contact (ADC) dream experiences wherein the dreamer could not possibly know that the person in his/her dream was deceased. At its most basic level consciousness, I believe, is merely physical awareness; i.e., an awareness suggested by the nature of tactile sensory. At the level ADC suggests, consciousness involves some ethereal form of awareness. Relative to evolution, some level of consciousness has existed from the very beginning of life—in my opinion. In my view, consciousness inhabits the physical and the structure of the physical determines the level of consciousness expressed or achieved through the physical. Comparing the nature of consciousness to an automobile driver, the physical would be represented by the automobile. I perceive the various components of the automobile as representing the various components of our central nervous system (CNS). Relative to evolution, the earliest incarnation of consciousness was like a driver who only had access to the chassis of an automobile--at the beginning of early life, consciousness had the makings of a vehicle but did not have the necessary components to properly manifest or transport through the physical. This is represented by the most primitive component of our CNS, the myelencephalon. As our CNS evolved, consciousness gained the capacity to reach new levels of expression and achievement through the physical. These are my thoughts, I welcome yours.
Hi Maerd,
Quote:
From the evolution point of view, shouldn't consciousness follow a pattern of gradual change with time from an initial very simple level of conscious state (when consciousness first evolved) into a more complicated, higher level of conscious state (like what we are today)?
From my perspective, consciousness is like a quantity of water and the physical is like a cup. Evolution, in my view, only applies to the cup not the water. I perceive consciousness as a constant that only changes as the cup of physicality evolves to contain greater quantities. In the beginning, the simplistic nature of physicality limited the quantity and quality of consciousness to simplistic levels. The earliest forms of planetary life (photoautotrophs) manifested a photosynthetic existence—a simplistic existence dependent on photosynthesis. As the demands of physicality grew, the cup of physicality evolved. This evolution of the physical enabled greater quantities of consciousness manifesting a more complicated existence—a complex existence dependent on foraging and predation. The way I speak of consciousness in the prior paragraph is how I perceive what some might consider our spiritual essence. From a strictly neurological perspective, consciousness is a manifestation of recent brain elements supported by primitive components of brain structure. As suggested by evolution, consciousness evolved in brain structure about 540 million years ago (about 3 billion years after the first forms of planetary life). My view of consciousness in brain structure is defined by the functions of the brain’s various components. For example, I believe that the primitive brain began to function as a mind when brain structure reached the thalamic level of evolution. I believe that the cortex is merely a sophisticated extension of the memory function began by limbic development. Also, I believe that the distinction between the conscious and unconscious mind and the nature of the subconscious is suggested by the distinction between the awake, sleep, and dream states of brain function. Your further thoughts are most welcome.
Hi Marcel,
Welcome to our discussion:
Marcel wrote:
I have other examples about the distinction: Take someone extremely sharp-whitted who get Alzheimer's disease. This person's apparent consiousness will decrease over time. Consider someone real bright who has brain damage after a car accident who has difficulty following a normal conversation. I'm sure you can come up with many such examples indicating the 'cup' has a dramatic impact on a person's ability to interact with the physical world. I do wonder how the cup and the water are tied? When the cup carries a given volume of water and gets damaged, does the water get drained to a certain degree?
Insightful! Indeed, disease and brain damage can siphon consciousness to levels below optimum. In my view, the destruction of brain tissue obstructs the access of consciousness to those aspects of the cup that facilitate such functions as memory, thought, and locomotion. Conversely, the cup of healthy brain structure may not be filled to its limit; i.e., consciousness may not have reached its full potential through current brain structure. When I think about the limits of consciousness imposed by the cup of physicality, I think about what may have been the distinction in brain function that led to the extinction of the Neanderthals and the rise of modern humans. If there was a distinction between the Neanderthals and modern humans, I believed brain structure and function would likely suggest what that distinction might have been. From my assessment of the evidence suggested by evolution and modern brain structure, our distinction from Neanderthals may reside in our use of the cortex and its functions that facilitate anticipatory behaviors. When we compare what we know of Neanderthal culture to modern human culture, we find very little innovations in how they lived and in the tools they used. This suggests to me, in basic terms, that Neanderthals were limited in their ability to anticipate their future needs. Collectively, I believe Neanderthals had reached the limits of their cortical facility—their consciousness could not exceed the limits their brain function imposed. As a cup for consciousness, the Neanderthal brain probably could not accommodate the measure and quality of thought processing essential to the kind of innovations modern humans have produced. If history is any example, another may yet supplant the cup of modern human consciousness. I encourage and welcome your further thoughts.
Hi Maerd,
Maerd wrote:
It is interesting to make analogies between the brain structure (for consciousness) and a "cup", and between the consciousness and "water". However, since "water" existed long before "cups", does your analogy imply that consciousness existed long before the evolution of brain structure and thus was independent of the brain structure?
Excellent question! Frankly, I have yet to consider completely the nature of consciousness before and beyond the physical suggested by this analogy’s implication. My perspective, thus far, only extends to how I perceive the nature of consciousness within the cup. Conceivably, consciousness may exist in some form that transcends the cup; i.e., consciousness may not be restricted to what it is able to manifest, express, or achieve through corporeal experience. If so, consciousness could have existed in some non-corporeal form long before the evolution of physical structure—inclusive of the brain. However, we generally equate consciousness with sentience and sentience with brain development. Accordingly, my perspective suggests how consciousness arose with the evolution of brain structure. I welcome your further thoughts.
Marcel wrote:
Using more of our brain would require more energy…Could we conceivably consider awakening all our past and present experiences and bringing them out to a conscious level simultaneously? This cup would be quite full…A little bit like a book, you cannot access all of it’s contents at once. You may look at all of a page at once, but grasping all the text’s meaning at once would require much concentration and multitasking.
Your thoughts here bring to my mind the interesting case of Kim Peek; he inspired Dustin Hoffman’s character in the movie Rain Man. Kim is an autistic savant with extraordinary memory capabilities. He can recall from memory any number of obscure facts as though laid before him in an opened book. One oddity of his recall involved the way his factual memory appeared to be organized; e.g., if the answer to a memory question involved a date fact, he might lurch into a song that was either written in a score he associated with the fact or was entitled in a way suggestive of it—as though all were somehow correct.
Marcel wrote:
…Maybe we are talking of 2 different kinds of cups…I wonder if the distinction is one of consciousness or one of brain canvas. I like comparing the eyesight focus with the concentration focus. Focussing on one thing reduces the ability to function around another, but this may be circumstantial. To this we may add the dimension of impairment that shifts a person’s comfort zone (eyesight or concentration) outside the “norm”.
In a TV program exploring Kim’s remarkable talent (The Real Rain Man, Discover Channel, air date uncertain), a doctor who had examined Kim’s medical record said that his brain did not have a corpus callosum (a condition known as agenesis). This suggested to me that the ability of Kim’s consciousness was a matter of canvas rather than focus, using your analogies. Kim’s canvas, his brain, does not have the configuration of normal or average brain structure. Therefore, his consciousness could only access memories and behavioral distinctions in the manner his canvas or cup permitted. Consequently, the grouping of facts in Kim’s mind and his autistic behavior seem peculiar to us of normal or average brain structure. This suggests to me that most distinctions we perceive between each other are likely a matter of brain structure rather than consciousness itself; we, on some basic level, are a force of equal potential primarily separated and limited by our brain configuration. From another perspective, we know from brain study how experience changes brain structure. New experiences form memories that can create new neural connections. In human studies, child neglect has resulted in below average brain development. In animal studies, the brain size of some domesticated animals was found to be smaller than their wild counterparts presumably because the experience of wild animals is richer. This all appears to suggest how genius or the expression of consciousness could be a matter of brain canvas/cup/configuration—in my opinion. I welcome your thoughts.
A compelling perspective:
Maerd wrote:
As we know, all life forms are composed of molecules that are not themselves alive. Same is true here. All conscious forms are composed of molecules that are not themselves conscious. From my perspective, consciousness vs. physical structure is like living (life) vs. "a pack of neurons".
Whether or not molecules are conscious is a matter of perspective, is it not? I think it is human nature to define “what is” and “what is not” by human standards; we judge others and other things by how we perceive ourselves. Can we be so sure about the non-existence of molecular consciousness just because it may not conform to our definition of consciousness? Perhaps we should consider what defines consciousness. As Marcel conveyed, the expanded use of brain function requires expanded energy. We know the brain cannot grow or function without energy. Every perception, thought, and feeling we experience requires and expends energy. By human standards, consciousness requires and expends energy. Therefore, on some basic level, consciousness may potentially exist wherever energy is required and expended. This seems to apply to atomic and subatomic particles. As I also perceive, another requirement or identifier of consciousness is its ability to define itself—an ability to distinguish itself as apart from its surroundings. A rock, for example, is not consciousness from our perspective. However, the molecules within the rock define how we perceive it. The molecular activity within the rock requires and expends energy to define its shape as a rock—does this not meet some basic criteria of consciousness? I welcome your thoughts.
Maerd wrote:
Do you define consciousness as energy????
No, of course not. I was merely suggesting how our perspective of consciousness, at this unenlightened stage in our evolution, could be a bit narrow.
Maerd wrote:
…why did you study the evolution of consciousness since energy (=consciousness) has nothing to do with evolution?
Actually, my interest in consciousness is merely an existential pursuit that satisfies the part of my being preconditioned from my youth to spiritualism. However, the interest enthralling the part of me that demands empirical evidence is not the study of consciousness but rather the study of the brain and brain function. Consciousness, as we generally define this quality, is a product of brain function; therefore, consciousness cannot exist corporeally without an underlying neurological structure as its progenitor. Empirically, our mind and psychology arise from the structure and function of our brain. My interest in brain evolution evolved from my investigation of how sleep and dreaming animals evolved. The clearest path for my study was provided by brain structure and how its components contributed to the sleep process. When I began to track the nature of sleep from the primitive components of the brain to recent components, it became clear to me that our ideas about contemporary brain structure and function lacked a proper foundation. Consequently, our ideas about functional distinctions and a host of brain related conditions and process could be incorrect. For example, contemporary science views the thalamus as sort of a switching station for sensory information entering and exiting the brain. The evolution of the thalamus suggests that it was the first incarnation of a proper brain (right and left hemisphere and hemispheric adhesion) marking the stage in evolution when the brain began to produce a mind. Perhaps more interesting is how the acquisition of sight perception may have led to thalamic and subsequent cortical evolution. The implications of a proper foundation in brain evolution could change how we diagnosis and treat brain trauma and conditions such as autism, Alzheimer, and insomnia just to name a few—in my opinion. I welcome your continued interest.
Maerd wrote:
My perspective is that one can not fully understand brain function without study of consciousness, as I believe that consciousness played a leading role in the formation and evolution of brain structure.
Again, I think the part consciousness played in brain evolution depends on how we define the nature of consciousness.
Maerd wrote:
I think consciousness and mind is basically the same thing.
I would agree if not for the perspective my investigation of brain evolution has provided. As we know, the brain is comprised of primitive and recent components. When we examine the most primitive components, we do not find the neurological developments suggestive of consciousness as we generally perceive. My investigation suggests that the energy needs of preexistent life compelled the adaptations leading to brain evolution. As that evolution appears to suggest, mind and consciousness are not quite the same. From my perspective of brain evolution, a mind is an environment of cognitive activity that arises from brain function within brain structure. Neurologically, brain function produces the mind and the mind produces consciousness. The clearest perspective of the distinction between mind and consciousness is suggested by my perspective of dream experience and content. In my perspective, the dreamer (as a dream component) describes or manifests his/her consciousness while the dreamer’s surroundings in a dream manifest his/her environment of cognitive activity; i.e., the dreamer = consciousness while the dream environment = mind. In my view, the mind is infinitely easier to understand and study than any other product of brain function. When we examine the evolutional path brain structure traveled to its current state, I think we find clear evidence of when and where the brain began producing a mind.
Maerd wrote:
What is the relationship between consciousness and sleep? Aren't they interrelated?
I believe dreaming provides the only link to consciousness amid sleep. As we have discussed elsewhere, dreaming isn’t sleep from my perspective. As you know, the dreaming brain engages in levels of activity equivalent to a wakeful brain. This suggests that dreaming could be a form consciousness amid sleep. Why we dream, as we have discussed, may not be as important to brain function and the nature of consciousness as the atonic release that accompanies dreaming. Dreaming without atonia does not produce the kind of restful sleep and increased mental acuity after sleep as dreaming does when concurrent with atonia. Dreaming is important to consciousness only to the extent to which we able to understand the relevance of dream content to our mental wellbeing. I welcome your thoughts.
Maerd wrote:
In my view, mind doesn't produce consciousness. Consciousness and mind come along hand in hand. Actually, one has to have consciousness to have mind…I would say that one can not fully understand mind without understanding of consciousness.
I assume your perspective is based on an assessment of brain function. Any idea we form about the nature of mind and consciousness without a valid basis in brain structure and function is probably unreliable—in my opinion. Perhaps if I provide the basis for my perspective of mind and consciousness, you will understand my conviction. I believe we agree that mind and consciousness are products of brain function. I also believe we agree that brain function comprises a concert of neural activity involving recent and primitive brain structures. When we evaluate these structures from the perspective of evolution, we get a sense of what the mind may be, how it evolved, and what constitutes its nature. So, let’s begin with evolution. What is evolution? Some of us perceive evolution as nature’s way of replacing older, less adaptive species with robust, more adaptive types. In reality, nature does not replace less adaptive species; it builds upon the successes of less adaptive species to create more adaptive types. Relative to brain structure, its primitive components are the foundation upon which nature has constructed our modern brain. From primitive to recent, brain structure is comprised of six segments: myelencephalon (MYEL), metencephalon (MET), mesencephalon (MES), diencephalon (DIEN), and telencephalon (TEL). Each segment provides a foundation for each seceding segment; e.g., MYEL is a foundation for MET function, MET a foundation for MES, etc. The neural evidence each segment provides suggests how each may have contributed to the adaptability of preexistent species. For example, animals at the MET stage of neural development had the advantage of sound perception, heighten taste distinctions, and gross locomotion over animals who had not evolved beyond the MYEL stage; animals at the initial stage of DIEN neural development had the advantage of sight perception over lesser evolved MET animals. When we evaluate brain structure contiguously from primitive to recent elements, we find structures associated with sight perception arising after those involving sound and before thalamic development. This was a critical development in brain evolution because the separate neurological sources of sensory information suggested by sight and sound perception meant that early animals had to integrate this divergent sensory before initiating some behavioral response to what they might have seen or heard. When early animals began to integrate what they heard or felt with what they perceived visually, they gained the ability to make behavior distinctions proactively. Rather than react to sound or tactile sensory, sighted animals could visually assess whether what they heard and felt required a response. Simply put, the integration of sight with earlier sensory abilities gave primitive animals the ability to think before reacting. The brain structure that corresponds to this development in early animals is the thalamus. From what we know of contemporary thalamic structure, all sensory information (except olfactory) must enter the thalamus before reaching superior brain structures. In early animals, the thalamus was the final destination for all sensory information; it gave primitive animals the ability to integrate multiple types of sensory input in a way that probably allowed them to produce behaviors independent of instinct. The capacity to engage in behaviors independent of instinct identifies a primary attribute of mind. The thalamus, with its right and left hemisphere and interthalamic adhesion, was likely nature’s prototype for contemporary cortical development. This evidence suggests to me that thalamic function defines what constitutes a mind.
Maerd wrote:
Dr. Mark Solms pointed out "dreaming and REM sleep are in fact doubly dissociable states, they have different physiological mechanisms, and in all likelihood they serve different functional purposes."
I disagree with Dr. Solms’ assessment because a critical analysis of his methods suggests he may have misinterpreted the result of his research. For example, REM (rapid eye movement) is believed to be disassociated with dreaming primarily because of experiments by Dr. Michel Jouvet in the early 1960’s. In animal experiments separating MES and MET structures from superior structures (low-decerebration), Jouvet found REM concurrent with atonia. This suggested to Jouvet that the neural mechanism for dreaming resides in this lower segment of brainstem. To Dr. Solms, the reactivation of superior brain structure (cortical structure) after separation from MES/MET structure suggested that the mechanisms for REM and dreaming are disassociated. Jouvet’s assessment of his results was incorrect because the REM he observed was the result of residual nerve impulses that surfaced after the cessation of surrounding MES/MET tonic neural activity. Solms’ assessment, based on the distinction Jouvet provided, is incorrect because Jouvet’s experiment ostensibly proved REM to be a product of the hierarchal brain activity that occurs while dreaming. Our eyes move when we experience dreaming because of their neural connection to our higher brain function. When we dream, our eyes move and our body does not because they do not share the same neural circuitry. Should Dr. Solms review the neural anatomy associated with eye movement, I believe he will find the idea of PGO spikes inspired movement unlikely. I welcome your thoughts
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